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Rambo Litigators: Pitting Aggressive
Tactics Against Legal Ethics
Thomas M. Reavley*
I. INTRODUCTION
A common topic today among lawyers, particularly trial lawyers, is
the increased resort to unfair tactics and intimidation by some of
their adversaries.' Regardless of the explanation for unprofessional
conduct,2 this widespread trend will further damage the bar unless it
is curtailed.3 Most experienced practitioners agree that this
"Rambo,"4 "take no prisoners" attitude is not a new problem, but one
that must be discouraged.5 Solicitor General Kenneth W. Starr, III,
* Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit; B.A., University
of Texas, 1942; J.D., Harvard University, 1948; L.L. M., University of Virginia, 1983;
Lecturer, Baylor University Law School; Adjunct Professor, University of Texas Law
School.
1. See, e.g., Arnett, The Trial Lawyer and Lawyering: Personal Values and Per-
ceptions, 33 TRIAL LAW. GUIDE 121, 121-32 (1989); Broder, When the Opponent Plays
Hardball ... The Practitioner Need Not Play Lowball, TRIAL, Aug. 1989, at 62-67;
Rymer, High Road, Low Road: Legal Profession at the Crossroads, TRIAL, Oct. 1989, at
79-83; Sayler, Rambo Litigation: Why Hardball Tactics Don't Work, A.B.A. J., Mar.
1988, at 79; Albright, Waging Unconditional Warfare, Tex. Law. Newspaper, Sept. 5,
1988 at 18, col. 1.
2. See infra notes 21-22 and accompanying text.
3. One court aptly noted:
Whether the increased size of the bar has decreased collegiality, or the legal
profession has become only a business, or experienced lawyers have ceased to
teach new lawyers the standards to be observed, or because of other factors
not readily categorized, we observe patterns of behavior that forebode ill of
our system of justice.
Dondi Properties Corp. v. Commerce Savings and Loan Ass'n, 121 F.R.D. 284, 286
(N.D. Tex. 1988) (footnote omitted).
4. Rambo is the last name of a fictional United States Green Beret veteran char-
acterized in a novel by John Morrell and later portrayed by Sylvester Stallone in sev-
eral recent films. See First Blood (Orion 1982); Rambo: First Blood Part II (Orion
1985); Rambo III (Tristar 1988). The character is the ultimate military warrior, always
willing and able to fight to the death.
5. Arnett, supra note 1, at 123. Arnett specifically stated:
said to a meeting of The American Law Institute in May 1989:6
[T]he legal literature teems with concerns over the decline in civility in our
own profession, with its ancient tradition of vigorous but nonetheless civil and
responsible advocacy .... [Tihe growing consensus is that misconduct is on
the rise in our large and overcrowded courthouses. Thoughtful members of
the bar and some members of the bench . . . are . . . quick to suggest that
wrongdoing within the profession is increasing and is going unpunished, as
overburdened courthouses become, like society itself, large and impersonal.
7
Solicitor General Starr continued:
Especially in this transitional period of our social history, we in the legal
profession must be particularly attentive to the permanent things that under-
gird our profession and ultimately our very way of life. We are called upon as
a profession to remember that, at its greatest, the profession stands not for
profits, it stands for the rule of law. It stands not for amassing billable hours,
it stands for human dignity, for the recognition of the ultimate value of every
man, woman, and child ....
Attention to the permanent things means attention to the community. It
means fostering a sense of community, within the profession and beyond. It
means integrity and candor in our professional labors. It means civility. It
means scholarship .... 8
This article will propose some suggestions on how the bar might
discourage nasty tricks and belligerency and how to cope with this
conduct when it is encountered. However, it should be recognized
that this misconduct has been around a long time. For example, after
fifty years as a trial lawyer, Clarence Darrow wrote in 1932 that tri-
als were not being conducted in a dignified effort to find the truth
I deeply regret that there appears to be a significant erosion in the historic
lawyer-client and lawyer-to-lawyer relationships of mutual respect and confi-
dence with an accompanying decrease in public appreciation of the extremely
important role that a trial lawyer can and should play in the lives and affairs
of this great nation.
Id at 125. Arnett further noted:
My reflections upon the state of the legal profession "then" and "now" reveal
two trends which I find particularly troubling: The diminution of Honor and
Integrity as non-negotiable values for the profession and the significant ero-
sion of collegiality and congeniality and cordiality and comradery and civility
(and yes, Friendship!) amongst the various elements of the practicing Bar, the
federal and state Benches, the teaching Bar and that new full employment en-
tity which we call house counsel or the corporate Bar.
The second trend to which I refer concerns the marked erosion in the civil-
ity and collegiality and courtesy which should characterize our dealings, one
with the other.
Id. at 127. Arnett also observed:
Indeed, and as an illustrative example of professional and public concerns, re-
cently the Dallas Bar Association has adopted "Guidelines of Professional
Courtesy" and its "Lawyer's Creed" and the Cleveland Bar Association has
published its "A Lawyer's Creed of Professionalism," which was in turn
adopted by the TIPS Section of the ABA. And, as we know, many other Bars
have been addressing these professional responsibility issues, i.e., the ABA
Center for Professional Responsibility and, among others, the states of Rhode
Island, Kentucky, Maryland, Virginia, Florida, Louisiana and Minnesota.
Id. at 122.
6. Luncheon address by Kenneth W. Starr, III, 66th Annual Meeting of The
American Law Institute 23 (May 18, 1989) [hereinafter Starr].
7. Id. at 32.
8. Id. at 35.
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but more like a prize-ring combat. 9
II. IT WAS WORSE BACK THEN...
During my eighteen years as a practicing trial lawyer,10 before and
in between my years on the bench,"1 there were always opposing law-
yers who would not hesitate to employ foul means to serve their pur-
poses. Deception and intimidation between lawyers is not a recent
development12 within the giant impersonal firms that fight for recog-
nition and big money.' 3 Because giant multi-city firms are driven by
high expenses, as well as heightened modern greed, they often focus
upon money rather than upon other important goals or the conse-
quences of their conduct.14
The predicament of young lawyers on the partnership track, driven
to large billings, may partially explain current problems.15 If unable
to curtail these practices in another manner, each firm should have
9. C. DARROW, THE STORY OF MY LIFE (1932), reprinted in C. DARROW, THE
STORY OF MY LIFE, THE LEGAL CLASSICS LIBRARY 352 (1988).
10. I was engaged in private practice from 1948 through 1964, and from 1977
through 1979.
11. District Judge, 167th District, 1964-67; Justice, Supreme Court of Texas, 1968-
77; Circuit Judge, Fifth Circuit, 1979-present.
12. In 1935, the Supreme Court commented on unfair trial tactics. The Court said
that a prosecutor "may prosecute with earnestness and vigor-indeed, he should do so.
But while he may strike hard blows, he is not at liberty to strike foul ones." Berger v.
United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935).
13. A survey by the American Lawyer indicated that in 1985 five law firms had
gross revenues of over $100 million, and that by 1987, this figure had increased to 20
law firms. Lacayo, Tremors in the Realm of Giants, TIME, Dec. 7, 1987, at 58.
The mega law firm has emerged as a new and important institution within
our profession. But query: How can such a law firm--or any such financially
driven organization-possibly afford to represent a continuum of little old la-
dies in tennis shoes in landlord-tenant controversies when the newest associ-
ate in that firm is earning $65,000 or $75,000 a year and is expected to generate
a substantial minimum number of billable hours?
Arnett, supra note 1, at 126 (emphasis in original).
14. Recent years "have seen a boom in alleged ethical lapses at even the bluest of
blue-chip firms." Lacayo, supra note 13, at 58. "Twenty years ago, lawyers said to cli-
ents, 'You can't do this.'. . . Now the old professional values have been eclipsed by the
desire to 'make the deal.'" Id. (quoting Cardozo Law School Professor William Brat-
ton). "Many lawyers say that law has always been a business .... Now it's just acting
like one." Id. (quoting Stanford University Law Professor Robert Gordon).
"[S]uccess is measured by high-style offices and high-stakes competition for clerks,
associates, partners, and clients." Rymer, supra note 1, at 79.
15. An attorney may resort to sharp tactics to increase billable hours as the result-
ing delays and additional activity-repeated requests, motions, protracted depositions
and trials-mean more hours of attorney time.
This practice "makes cases slower, more expensive and more unpleasant."
Margolick, The Law; at the Bar, N.Y. Times, Aug. 5, 1988, § B, at 5, col. 1. "[F]or lay-
at least one partner who is available to ensure the young lawyer's
professionalism and to discuss problems involving legal ethics and
morals.16
During the 1930s, when I frequented the offices of local lawyers in
the small towns of East Texas, looking for some justification to be
near them and their work, with or without pay, some of these local
lawyers boasted of the tricks played on their opposition. During my
practice there in 1948, some of the trial lawyers regularly interfered
with deposition testimony by coaching their own witnesses, usually
off the record, and by employing tactics to upset adverse witnesses.
Young opposing lawyers were verbally abused and even threatened
with physical attack. Promises were made about disclosure, settings,
settlements, and continuances, only to be violated. Sidebar remarks
during trial were common. Elected state judges offered the victims
no protection because their objectives were to avoid hassle and to be
reelected without opposition.
Lawyer tactics frequently were worse than that. We encountered
more professional and judicial misconduct in those days, misdeeds
which would lead to disbarment today.17 For example, I recall a spe-
ishly paid young lawyers anxious to impress superiors, dragging things out means
more hours to bill for." Id. For example, one commentator recently stated:
[T]he competition for top law students has driven starting pay to above $70,000
a year in some places. But to earn their keep, new associates are expected to
rack up at least 2,000 billable hours annually. That leaves little time for per-
sonal lives or for pro bono work, the free services provided to indigent clients
or public-service groups.
Lacayo, supra note 13, at 58.
"Advancement is paced as much by billable hours as professional honor.
Rymer, supra note 1, at 79.
16. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 5.1 (1983). Rule 5.1 states:
Responsibilities of a Partner or Supervisory Lawyer
(a) A partner in a law firm shall make reasonable efforts to ensure that the
firm has in effect measures giving reasonable assurance that all lawyers in the
firm conform to the rules of professional conduct.
(b) A lawyer having direct supervisory authority over another lawyer shall
make reasonable efforts to ensure that the other lawyer conforms to the rules
of professional conduct.
(c) A lawyer shall be responsible for another lawyer's violation of the rules of
professional conduct if: (1) the lawyer orders or, with knowledge of the spe-
cific conduct, ratifies the conduct involved; or (2) the lawyer is a partner in
the law firm in which the other lawyer practices, or has direct supervisory au-
thority over the other lawyer, and knows of the conduct at a time when its
consequences can be avoided or mitigated but fails to take reasonable reme-
dial action.
Id.
"The calling that is our profession must be passed on. By precept, impact to your
colleagues what it is to be a lawyer; inspire by example. Let it be known that nothing
less will do than the highest standards of professional competence and conduct."
Rymer, supra note 1, at 83.
17. "The old Historic 'Canons of Professional Ethics' were replaced by the 'Code
of Professional Responsibility' and later replaced by the 'Model Rules of Professional
Conduct.'" Arnett, supra note 1, at 122. "[Tjhe 1980 amendment to 28 USC § 1927 and
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cific case of jury tampering. In the early 1960s, I tried a case which
affected the ownership of millions of dollars in timber and land in
the redwood forests of California and the piney woods of Texas. My
client lost because of an adverse jury verdict. Years later, the court
reporter told me that the judge had allowed the opposing local law-
yer to name the jury commissioners who selected the panel from
which the trial jurors were selected.
In another city, there was a lawyer who regularly conducted ex
parte business with the judge about his cases.' 8 When he later came
to the hearing or trial, he was quick to find some excuse to exercise
his enormous capacity for righteous indignation against me.
In 1977, after fourteen years on the bench,19 I left to take a trial
docket as a practitioner. After looking at the first file on my desk, I
called the opposing lawyer and proposed that we each take deposi-
tions of the other's expert witnesses. The lawyer had been a long
time friend of mine, and I expected a pleasant experience in working
with him on the case. Although he knew the names of my two ex-
perts, I had no information concerning either his prospective wit-
nesses or the engineers employed by his client who would be familiar
with the circumstances leading to the litigation. He informed me
that he would need additional time to get the names of his witnesses
and experts, and that he would get back to me. The next day, how-
ever, I received notices for the depositions of my two expert wit-
nesses on an inconvenient date. Despite my attempts to arrange a
new date, he did not respond to my telephone calls, and the deposi-
tions of my experts proceeded. Several weeks later, the lawyer fi-
nally informed me that he h~d located the witnesses who could
competently testify about the events at issue and that we could
schedule a week in the upcoming month for a complete set of deposi-
the more recent amendments to Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were
an attempted judicial response to abuses within the adversarial system." Id. at 128.
Formal rules of conduct have become a partial substitute for an eroding sense
of personal responsibility and professional community. As Grant Gilore [sic]
once said: 'The better the society, the less law there will be. In Heaven there
will be no law, and the lion will lie down with the lamb .... The worse the
society, the more law there will be. In Hell there will be nothing but law, and
due process will be meticulously observed.'
Albright, supra note 1, at 19, col. 1 (quoting G. GILMORE, THE AGES OF AMERICAN LAW
111 (1977)).
18. For the ethical rules regarding ex parte communications with the court, see
MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-110(B) and EC 7-35 (1988).
19. District Judge, 167th District, 1964-67; Justice, Supreme Court of Texas, 1968-
77.
tions. Nevertheless, when the scheduled date arrived, and after I had
traveled 200 miles, the lawyer presented me with a bundle of pages
listing thousands of his client's employees in the geographical area,
any one of which I could select to be deposed. Despite these initial
impediments, the jury awarded my client everything asked for in this
case. Ironically, my old friend could have settled this case at a con-
siderable saving to his client upon our initial contact.
No one expects to transform all lawsuits into friendly efforts re-
sulting in mutual agreement. Although cooperation with opposing
counsel is desirable, there inevitably will be cases on the docket in
which witnesses and parties resist the disclosure of unfavorable evi-
dence or their attorneys attempt to dominate the proceedings in and
out of court. Circumstances and people also differ. However, at a
minimum, the legal community is entitled to expect an opposing at-
torney to be honest, to fulfill promises, and to give reasonable accom-
modation on deadlines and settings.20
III. REASONS FOR NASTINESS...
Three principal explanations exist for sharp and nasty practices by
20. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-38 (1981) states: "A
Lawyer should be courteous to opposing counsel and should accede to reasonable re-
quests regarding court proceedings, settings, continuances, waiver of procedural for-
malities, and similar matters which do not prejudice the rights of his client." Id.
MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-101(A)(1) (1981) states:
A lawyer does not violate this Disciplinary Rule, however, by acceding to rea-
sonable requests of opposing counsel which do not prejudice the rights of his
client, by being punctual in fulfilling all professional commitments, by avoid-
ing offensive tactics, or by treating with courtesy and consideration all persons
involved in the legal process.
Id.
MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-102(A)(1) (1981) states:
In his representation of a client, a lawyer shall not: (1) File a suit, assert a
position, conduct a defense, delay a trial, or take other action on behalf of his
client when he knows or when it is obvious that such action would serve
merely to harass or maliciously injure another.
Id.
MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-106(C)(5)-(6) (1981) states:
In appearing in his professional capacity before a tribunal, a lawyer shall not:
... (5) Fail to comply with known local customs of courtesy or practice of the
bar or a particular tribunal without giving to opposing counsel timely notice of
his intention not to comply. (6) Engage in undignified or discourteous conduct
which is degrading to a tribunal.
Id. Arnett also noted:
[T]here is no place whatever in our noble profession for rudeness, discourtesy,
and "cheap shots." In my judgment, there is simply no place in the trial law-
yer's lexicon for "sharking" and "take no prisoners" and "hard ball" ... in the
worst definitional sense of the last pejorative phrase. Those words and
phrases involve demon devices and are inconsistent with how our system is
intended to work and how our learned craft is intended to function.
Arnett, supra note 1, at 127 (emphasis in original).
"It is absolutely necessary and essential that a lawyer's representation or word be as
'good as gold.'" Id. at 128.
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trial lawyers. First, many consider these practices a natural aspect of
the adversarial system.21 Second, some lawyers believe these prac-
tices win lawsuits.22 Third, there are lawyers who believe these prac-
tices pay because their clients want them.
IV. ANSWERS...
Bar associations by resolutions,23 leading lawyers by their
speeches,24 and professors in their classroom instruction 25 widely
condemn abusive and unprofessional behavior. This condemnation is
important. Lawyers, particularly young ones, should know that this
behavior is improper 26 because they are officers of the courts,27 serv-
21. Monroe H. Freedman, a professor of legal ethics at Hofstra University School
of Law, hails "taking every advantage available within the bounds of the rules." Frey,
Nice Guys Don't Have to Finish Last, Manhattan Law., Aug. 9, 1988, at 9. Professor
Freedman remarks that "[t]he idea of some old-boy obligation to forgo tactics that are
both legal and ethical and in the interests of the client is a highly offensive notion."
Id. "Lindsey Miller-Lerman, head of the litigation department at Kutak, Rock and
Campbell in Omaha, Neb., holds a similar view .... Id.
The erroneous notion that responsibility to clients supersedes all other profes-
sional responsibilities seems to be gaining popularity among members of the
bar. This notion has led an increasing number of lawyers to ignore agree-
ments they have made with opposing counsel in order to advance the per-
ceived interests of their clients. It also has led to a general decline in fair
dealing between counsel during the course of litigation as well as in the per-
formance of the other duties lawyers owe to one another.
Miner, Lawyers Owe One Another, Nat'l L.J., Dec. 19, 1988, at 14, col. 1.
22. In many cases these tactics are used to run up the opponent's expense and
force the client to settle or abandon the lawsuit if the costs are prohibitive. "Rambos
win with a body count and a lawsuit becomes a war of attrition. The last client to fin-
ish the case is the one who wins." Taylor, Texas Sets Its Sights on 'Rambo'; A Style of
Litigation Draws Fire, Nat'l L.J., July 31, 1989, at 24, col. 1 (quoting Justice Cook,
Texas Supreme Court). While these tactics are of limited value in small cases, they
are not effective in large cases where the stakes are high.
23. Some bar associations include: California, Georgia, Dallas, Association of the
Bar of New York City, Cleveland, and Little Rock, Arkansas. Frey, supra note 21, at
9.
24. See Starr, supra note 6; Arnett, supra note 1.
25. See H. CALDWELL, G. NICHOLS & S. STEDING, CALIFORNIA TRIALBOOK (1990);
T. MAUET, FUNDAMENTALS OF TRIAL TECHNIQUES (1980).
26. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-10 (1981) states: "The
duty of a lawyer to represent his client with zeal does not militate against his concur-
rent obligation to treat with consideration all persons involved in the legal process and
to avoid the infliction of needless harm." Id.
MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-36 (1981) states:
Judicial hearings ought to be conducted through dignified and orderly proce-
dures designed to protect the rights of all parties. Although a lawyer has the
duty to represent his client zealously, he should not engage in any conduct
that offends the dignity and decorum of proceedings. While maintaining his
independence, a lawyer should be respectful, courteous, and above-board in
his relations with a judge or hearing officer before whom he appears. He
ing public justice28 and the judicial system.29 It is unacceptable for a
lawyer to deceive and abuse another member of the legal profes-
sion.30 Furthermore, it makes life and the practice of law unpleas-
ant 31 and unhealthy.32 The federal district judges of the Northern
District of Texas, using guidelines and a creed promulgated by the
Dallas Bar Association, sat en banc in two cases pending before that
court to announce the standards of litigation conduct.33 On Novem-
ber 7, 1987, the Supreme Court of Texas and the Court of Criminal
Appeals of Texas promulgated and adopted "The Texas Lawyer's
Creed-A Mandate for Professionalism" addressing the lawyers' pro-
fessional relationship with clients, judges, other attorneys, and the
legal system. 34 A copy of the creed is appended at the end of this ar-
ticle because it reflects the Texas courts' concern regarding abusive,
unprofessional conduct, and the judges have set forth in detail the
conduct they expect from lawyers.
I believe it is time for us to reexamine our concepts and the opera-
tion of the adversarial system. Recently, an appellant at the outset of
the argument in his brief lamented: "The judicial system in our
should avoid undue solicitude for the comfort or convenience of judge or jury
and should avoid any other conduct calculated to gain special consideration.
Id. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-106(C)(2) (1981) states: "In
appearing in his professional capacity before a tribunal, a lawyer shall not: ... (2) Ask
any question that he has no reasonable basis to believe is relevant to the case and that
is intended to degrade a witness or other party ... ." Id
For the text of the MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-38, see
supra note 20. For the text of the MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR
7-101(A)(1), 7-102(A)(1), 7-106(C)(5)-(6), see supra note 21.
27. See Mallard v. U.S. District Court for S. Dist. of Iowa, 109 S. Ct. 1814, 1823
(1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring); id. at 1825 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (noting that
"[a]ttorneys are officers of the court .... ) (quoting Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45
(1932)); In re Snyder, 472 U.S. 634, 643 (1985); Ex parte Garland, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 333,
378-79 (1867); Martineau, The Attorney as an Officer of the Court: Time to Take the
Gown Off the Bar, 35 S.C.L. REV. 541, 543-48 (1984).
28. Fisch, Coercive Appointments of Counsel in Civil Cases in Forma Pauperis:
An Easy Case Makes Hard Law, 50 Mo. L. REv. 527, 539 (1985).
29. Theard v. United States, 354 U.S. 278, 281 (1957).
30. For the lawyer's duty to cooperate with opposing counsel and the court, see
MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-38, supra note 20. For the law-
yer's duty to be courteous to opposing counsel and the court, see MODEL CODE OF PRO-
FESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-106(C)(5)-(6), supra note 20.
31. "[I]t makes cases slower, more expensive and more unpleasant." Margolick,
supra note 15, at 5, col. 1.
32. "Rambos... may not live as long as their peers." Id. at 5, col. 1.
In the long run, hardball litigation is bad for the lawyer. A steady diet of
hardball litigating can not be good for a lawyer's health and personal life. No
one can prove this although I am aware of a statement by the head of a New
York litigation department that no partner in the firm's long history had ever
lived past age 66, and that a large number had died in their 40s and 50s. Suf-
fice it to say that 12 hours of bile a day somehow will take its toll.
Sayler, supra note 1, at 80.
33. See Dondi Properties Corp. v. Commerce Savings and Loan Ass'n, 121 F.R.D.
284 (N.D. Tex. 1988).
34. See Appendix for the text of the "Texas Lawyer's Creed."
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country is based entirely upon the adversarial system. That is, it is
generally a combat zone for attorneys where the judges act as moder-
ators." 35 I believe that truth and justice, as well as;economy, will suf-
fer in such a system or at the hands of those who see things this way.
Henry Brougham told the House of Lords in 1820 that saving the
client "at all hazards and costs to other persons, and, amongst them,
to himself, is his first and only duty; and in performing this duty he
must not regard the alarm, the torments, the destruction which he
may bring upon others." 36 If the preceding quote is indeed the atti-
tude of counsel, one might not expect the advocate's conduct to be
exemplary. Unfortunately, that concept of hardball litigation has a
long and proud history.37 Many lawyers are deeply dedicated to that
erroneous view of trial conduct and their participating roles.38 This
35. The specific brief is not cited here because it will not add anything to the argu-
ment; however, this proposition has been put forward by others in a slightly different
form in the past. See generally Goldberg, Playing Hardball, A.B.A. J., July 1, 1987 at
48.
Rather than seeing themselves as professionals with the self-imposed duty of
integrity, in whose hands the search for justice lies, too many lawyers today
view themselves "solely as combatants, or who perceive that they are retained
to win at all costs without regard to fundamental principles of justice," the
Northern District [of Texas] judges said in their order [in Dondi Properties].
Albright, supra note 1, at 19, col. 1.
36. 2 Trial of Queen Caroline 8 (J. Nightingale ed. 1821), quoted in M. FREEDMAN,
LAWYERS' ETHICS IN AN ADVERSARY SYSTEM 9 (1975); D. MELLINKOFF, THE CON-
SCIENCE OF A LAWYER 189 (1973).
37. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Canon 7 (1981) states: "A
Lawyer Should Represent a Client Zealously within the Bounds of the Law." Id. For
the lawyer's duty to use lawful means to meet the client's objective, see MODEL CODE
OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-101(A)(1), supra note 21. For the lawyer's
duty to balance the client's interests with the obligation of being considerate to others,
see MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-10, supra note 26.
"In the Journal article, proponents of hardball claimed that it was not just permissi-
ble, but obligatory for fulfilling an advocate's duty to serve his clients." Sayler, supra
note 1 at 79.
Every month, more judges are thundering at counsel perceived to be hardbal-
lers, as did Illinois Circuit Court Judge Richard Curry, who wrote in a recent
decision: "Zealous advocacy is the buzz word which is squeezing decency and
civility out of the law profession .... Zealous advocacy is the modern-day
plague which infects and weakens the truth finding process and which makes
a mockery of the lawyers' claim to officer of the court status."
Id. at 81 (citing Hanna v. American Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. of Chicago, No. 87CH4561
(Cook County Cir. Ct., Ill. 1987)).
38. Goldberg, supra note 35, at 48. Barry Montgomery, Philip Corboy, Gerry
Spence, Bill Colson, Monroe Freedman, Lindsey Miller-Lerman, and Don Reuben are
hardball players. Id. Alan Dershowitz, Judah Best, Raoul Felder, Robert B. Fiske,
and Gloria Allred also support hardball tactics. Goldberg & Hengstler, Hardball Is ...
A.B.A. J., July 1, 1987, at 52.
attitude also permeates the general public and business community.39
When lay people have to go to court, they usually want the toughest
lawyers to represent them. The client often thinks that the best law-
yers are the bulldogs who take every advantage and means to win.40
V. DOES NOT PAY...
For these clients and lawyers, the combat mode of advocacy is far
more expensive than effective.41 Offending lawyers speak of the
duty of zealous representation of the client.42 Although earnest,
forceful, and devoted representation is both zealous and proper,
Rambo and kamikaze lawyers lead themselves 4 3 and their clients to
zealous extinction.
Elaborate pretrial proceedings and protracted courtroom battles
39. "The failure of these lawyers to hold themselves to a higher ethical standard
has created a distrust among lawyers and low esteem for the profession in the eyes of
the public, to the detriment of our system of justice." Albright, supra note 1, at 19, col.
1. "Will Rogers put it thus: 'I don't think you can make a lawyer honest by an act of
legislature. You've got to work on his conscience. And his lack of conscience is what
makes him a lawyer.'" Rymer, supra note 1, at 81.
40. Albright specifically observed:
Lawyers who employ these abusive tactics successfully receive tremendous
amounts of publicity in [the Texas Lawyer Newspaper] and others. They de-
velop a reputation for being "tough," exactly what many clients engaged in
bitter business disputes want. They make a great deal of money. In the com-
petitive business climate that the law practice has become, more and more at-
torneys are tempted to use abusive tactics to attract clients and keep them
happy.
Albright, supra note 1, at 18, col. 2. "No doubt a few clients feel more 'loved' if their
lawyer is Attila the Hun-some lawyers have been retained for just this reason." Say-
ler, supra note 1, at 79. "While all lawyers play hardball at some time in their careers,
some do so routinely, relishing their bulldog image and the adrenalin rush of battle."
Goldberg & Hengstler, supra note 38, at 52.
41. Typically the discovery period will be prolonged and the costs will be substan-
tially higher. Frey, supra note 21, at 9. The trial will be delayed and take longer.
There is no empirical evidence to support the assertion that these tactics result in
more favorable verdicts or awards for their proponents. In fact, most attorneys believe
that when judges and juries recognize these unfair tactics, they find their proponents
less credible and treat them accordingly.
"Robert Sayler, a division director of the American Bar Association's Section of Liti-
gation and a partner at Covington & Burling in Washington D.C., said 'combativeness
and mean-spiritedness' almost never win over the judge or jury." Id.
42. For the lawyer's duty to zealously represent his client, see MODEL CODE OF
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Canon 7, supra note 37. For the lawyer's duty to bal-
ance the client's interest with being considerate to other persons, see MODEL CODE OF
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-10, supra note 26. For the lawyer's duty to use
lawful means to achieve the client's objectives, see MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RE-
SPONSIBILITY DR 7-101(A)(1), supra note 21.
43. "Rambos don't get referrals from other lawyers, are rarely picked to lead mul-
tiparty litigation teams, and may not live as long as their peers." Margolick, supra
note 15, at 5, col. 1. "Hardball litigation tends to dry up those sources of business gen-
erated by word of mouth. Every time a trial lawyer handles a case, he is being judged
by a multitude of colleagues. The* impressions they form often bear decisively on fu-
ture business prospects." Sayler, supra note 1, at 81.
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often do not serve the client's best interest and seldom serve any
other purpose, when the opponent is reasonably fair-minded, except
to increase legal fees. Alternative dispute resolution is exposing the
futility and waste of the combat mode of advocacy.44 During one
week in September 1989, the district courts of Travis County, Texas,
inaugurated a settlement week employing mediation. 45  The
mediators, assigned by the court, were practicing attorneys who had
completed a mediation seminar course.46 Any party in a pending case
could place the case on the settlement docket.47 All attorneys were
required to have their clients present during the mediation session.
Forty-four percent of the cases were settled that week, and the issues
were narrowed in another thirty-three percent.48 The highest inci-
dence of settlement occurred in prediscovery cases.49 Products liabil-
ity cases, involving multiple parties and amounts in controversy in
excess of $300,000, had a fifty-percent incidence of settlement.5 0
This experience in using mediation is interesting because of its suc-
cess for clients and the court docket. However, it also says something
about the folly of combat adjudication. In the presence of a knowl-
44. Alternative dispute resolution "refers to non-litigation or non-judicial
processes for resolving legal disputes." Lowry, Alternative Dispute Resolution: How
Will Lawyers Respond?, 49 ORE. ST. BAR BULL. 1, 1 (May 1989). "The movement is
widespread and pervasive." Id. It encompasses negotiation, mediation, arbitration,
mini-trials, and multi-door courthouses. "The track record of non-litigation processes
strongly confirms their value if wisely and appropriately used." Id. at 2.
The compelling need for quicker, less expensive, and more effective means for
managing and resolving disputes has changed corporate expectations regard-
ing legal services. Recent attention to the expansion of corporate legal depart-
ments, dramatic reforms in the billing practices of major law firms, and
increased interest in preventive practices all confirm that high legal costs will
no longer be tolerated.
Henry, Alternative Dispute Resolution: Meeting the Legal Needs of the 1980s, 1 J. Dis-
PUTE RESOLUTION 113, 113 (1985). The corporate mini-trial "is an effective mix of ad-
versary, mediation, and negotiation techniques that has resolved many protracted
corporate disputes in a matter of weeks." Id. at 114. "The costs of a mini-trial are esti-
mated to be ten percent of ordinary litigation." Id. at 117. "The mini-trial can greatly
reduce the time spent on a lawsuit." Id. "A further benefit of the mini-trial is the de-
gree of confidentiality not found in formal litigation." Id. "Ultimately, the solutions
constructed by business executives are often more pragmatic and supportive of busi-
ness objectives than those reached in traditional settlements or issued by the courts."
Id. "The dispute resolution movement is progressing at a swift rate, significantly
changing the procedural processes of the American legal system." Id. at 120.
45. Galton, Settlement Week Report, 11 AUSTIN LAW. J. 1, 1 (Nov. 1989).
46. Id. at 2.
47. Id. at 3.
48. Id. at 1.
49. Id.
50. Id.
edgeable mediator and the client, posturing by the attorney was inap-
propriate and of no advantage. The mediators reported no abusive
behavior.51 Absent abuse and pretense, the parties made progress to-
ward an acceptable resolution.52
Judges and lawyers should speak out more about the unsatisfactory
results of unprofessional conduct,53 and more thought should be
given to methods which will ensure a proper penalty for misbehav-
ior.54 For those lawyers who are contemplating this unprofessional
method of doing business, the undesirable consequences should be
explained.5 5 At the same time, for those who choose this manner of
doing business, we should make it bad business.56
VI. IT IS WRONG...
How to best obtain success and monetary reward is not the only is-
sue attending our conduct in an adversary system. The lawyer has a
moral obligation-to himself and his client, as well as to others.5 7 In
Spaulding v. Zimmerman,58 a personal injury suit had been advanta-
51. Id. at 1-2.
52. Id. at 3.
53. The courts have long recognized that the judge has a responsibility for the or-
derly conduct of a trial. See, e.g., Viereck v. United States, 318 U.S. 236, 248 (1943)
(noting that "the trial judge should have stopped counsel's discourse without waiting
for an objection"); United States v. Turtenko, 490 F.2d 678, 683 (7th Cir. 1973)
(stressing the importance of decorum in the courtroom and stating that "[tihe judge is
not a spectator at a gladiatorial contest"); see also United States v. Cook, 432 F.2d 1093,
1107 (7th Cir. 1970).
54. "[T]h e 1980 amendment to 28 USC § 1927 and the more recent amendments to
Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were an attempted judicial response to
abuses within the adversarial system." Arnett, supra note 1 at 128.
Furthermore, "sanctions are available to the trial court that are more specifically di-
rected at the attorney. The court may deliver a reprimand either immediately or after
the jury has been excused from the courtroom. In the event of flagrant misconduct,
the attorney may be held in contempt of court." Caldwell, Name Calling at Trial:
Placing Parameters on the Prosecutor, 8 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 385, 394 (1985).
"Many attorneys, like Corboy [a hardball player], believe that the increasing ten-
dency of federal courts to impose sanctions for rule violations is proving an effective
deterrent." Goldberg, supra note 35, at 49.
55. Arnett noted:
I have practiced before some very great jurists .... Then, as now, those finer
jurists-as paragons of integrity-would accept without qualification reputa-
ble counsels' representations of fact and law. This phenomenon is of inestima-
ble value to clients but counsel should constantly be mindful of that fragile
virtue: it takes years to earn a reputation for credibility with our practicing
and juristic colleagues and that reputation can be destroyed in a moment.
Arnett, supra note 1, at 128.
"In court or out, integrity is the greatest influence on reputation, and the reputation
that precedes and follows a lawyer is the single most valuable asset he or she can ever
have." Rymer, supra note 1, at 81.
56. See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
57. See Reavley, A Perspective on the Moral Responsibility of Lawyers, 19 TEX.
TECH L. REV. 1393 (1988).
58. 116 N.W.2d 704 (Minn. 1962).
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geously settled by the defendant's insurer without the disclosure of
the defendant's medical expert's finding of an aneurysm in the plain-
tiff's aorta.59 Although defense counsel knew of the aortic aneu-
rysm, that it was life threatening,60 and that the plaintiff was
unaware of this condition,61 counsel proceeded to settle and close the
case without disclosing the plaintiff's condition.62 The Minnesota
Supreme Court upheld the vacation of the settlement because the
plaintiff had been a minor during the settlement and the trial court
had not considered all of his injuries in approving the minor's settle-
ment.6 3 Neither court questioned the ethics or good faith of the de-
fense counsel's settling without disclosing the presence of a condition
which endangered the plaintiff's life without prompt surgery.64 Pre-
sumably, if the plaintiff had been twenty-one years of age at the time
of settlement, instead of twenty, that would have been the end of the
matter. Whatever the legal consequences between the plaintiff and
the defendant, how can the defendant's counsel justify this conduct?
At the very least, the lawyer should have called his client for permis-
sion to disclose the medical report to the plaintiff. The consequences
here were so serious that the lawyer should not be permitted to par-
ticipate in adversary representation because he not only cheated the
plaintiff, but he endangered the plaintiff's life.
I reiterate that insidious conduct does not obtain its desired re-
sults.65 My observations over the past forty years have been that
nasty and devious lawyers seldom enjoy either good standing or pros-
perity.6 6 Their attitude shows--on their faces and in their voices. Ju-
rors *and judges dislike what they see.67 Unfair advocates are
distrusted.68 Jurors customarily first decide the credibility of the
59. Id. at 708.
60. Id. at 707.
61. Id. at 708.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 709.
64. Id.
65. "Avoid cheap remarks. Doing so will maintain your credibility as an advocate
throughout the trial. The lawyer that wins the race for credibility is the one who is a
strenuous advocate, fights for his client, yet operates within the bounds of fundamen-
tal fairness." T. MAUET, supra note 25, at 21.
66. The "Goliaths of the Bar were without exception honorable people." Arnett,
supra note 1, at 128.
67. "[T]he lawyers, as well as the parties, are on trial. That trial begins when you
first enter the courtroom and lasts until the court rules on the last post-trial motion.
Remember that your conduct as counsel is constantly being evaluated and compared
by everyone in the courtroom." T. MAUET, supra note 25, at 21.
68. Mauet noted that:
lawyers and then weigh the evidence accordingly. 69 Furthermore,
the role of the lawyer in the judge's decision-making depends upon
the lawyer's credibility with the judge.70 Careful and accurate treat-
ment of the record and legal precedent is mandatory.71 Misstate-
ments and overzealous arguments are costly to the advocate because
the judge likely will discount the lawyer's role in the court's deci-
sional process. The mission of advocacy is forfeited when credibility
is lost.
VII. WHEN CLIENTS WANT IT...
The need for credibility and fairness is a message that must be
demonstrated to business clients. Too many people in business be-
lieve that influence with the judge and obstreperous bulldog advo-
cacy win lawsuits.72 They need enlightenment. 73 They are the ones
who must pay the extra costs of protracted motion and discovery
warfare, and they must suffer the defeat when unfairness boomer-
angs against them.74 However, there are clients and lawyers whose
objective is not a fair trial, or any trial, but surrender and ven-
geance. 75 They harass other litigants with motions and discovery un-
Surveys of jurors have shown that the most favorable impressions are created
by lawyers who act and look well prepared and knowledgeable, have effective
verbal abilities and demonstrate dedication to their client within the bounds
of fairness. The least liked qualities are unnecessary theatrics and lack of
preparation, particularly when it wastes time.
Id. at 21.
69. For suggestions concerning maintaining credibility, see supra notes 65, 67, 68.
70. For a lawyer's ability to slowly build, and quickly lose, his or her reputation,
see Arnett, supra note 1, at 128; see also supra note 55.
71. "Courts are overpapered with backbiting and underpapered with citation to
relevant authority." Rymer, supra note 1, at 79.
72. Sayler, supra note 1, at 79.
73. "[H]e wins because he's ornery. But judges regularly contend that the reverse
is true. It defies all common experience to believe that meanspiritedness is persua-
sive." Id.; see also McKeon, The Effect of ADR on the Corporate Bottom Line, in COM-
MITTEE ON ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION, TORT AND INSURANCE PRACTICE
SECTION, AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION ANNUAL MEETING (Aug. 10, 1988). In the Con-
necticut ADR Project, 80% of the over 1000 cases agreed to participate and "[o]ver 90%
of cases heard in some type of forum were settled." Id. at 3. Travelers Insurance Com-
pany reported that the use of ADR has reduced the life of claims files by approxi-
mately seven months and produced a legal expense saving of $1,000 per case. Id. at 13.
Since Travelers uses staff counsel, "its reasonable to assume that companies that use
outside counsel would experience significantly greater savings." Id.
"[W]ith increased emphasis on streamlined business operations, cost effective man-
agement, and a desire of all corporate entities to reduce their dispute-related transac-
tion costs, ADR has taken a foothold that will not be relinquished." Id. at 5.
74. For the advantage of using alternative dispute resolution in business disputes,
see Henry, supra note 44, at 113.
75. "The basic theme is to make life miserable for an opponent and win the law-
suit." Broder, supra note 1, at 62.
Meanwhile, the parties are so uncooperative that discovery and resolution of
the underlying dispute are stalled. The abusive lawyer's client, however, is
well-prepared for the cost and delay, because it may well have been part of
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til frustration or exhaustion causes their victims to capitulate.76
Furthermore, some clients care more about embarrassing and bur-
dening the enemy through abuse perpetrated by their hired bulldogs
than actually resolving the case. This is where judges must take a
firm stand.V7 Although judges typically are reluctant to intervene in
discovery disputes or to sanction lawyers,78 they must recognize that
exceptions should be made when abuses of the profession and legal
process can be prevented or remedied only by the judge. Judges
should be more alert to the problem and be willing to act.
VIII. WHEN You ENCOUNTER IT...
How should one cope with unfair tactics by an adversary? Leave
nothing to the unwritten word and bring deceit and unfair tactics to
the attention of the judge and jury whenever possible. Confirm all
the overall war plan. The opposition unfortunately is forced to spend a like
amount of attorneys' fees or fold up his tent and go home, either by settling or
filing for bankruptcy protection. Abusive tactics thus are rewarded and jus-
tice often is denied.
Albright, supra note 1, at 18, col. 2.
76. See Taylor, supra note 22, at 24, col. 1.
77. One commentator observed:
Judges are speaking out in opinions, in legal education programs and in stern
lectures from the bench. A judge can control counsel behavior-including be-
havior outside his presence-by making it clear that obnoxious conduct will
not succeed in court, by inviting motions on lawyer misconduct, by imposing
sanctions and the like.
Sayler, supra note 1, at 81. The court in Dondi Properties specifically stated:
Those litigators who persist in viewing themselves solely as combatants, or
who perceive that they are retained to win at all costs without regard to fun-
damental principles of justice, will find that their conduct does not square
with the practices we expect of them. Malfeasant counsel can expect instead
that their conduct will prompt an appropriate response from the court, includ-
ing the range of sanctions the Fifth Circuit suggests in the Rule 11 context: "a
warm friendly discussion on the record, a hard-nosed reprimand in open
court, compulsory legal education, monetary sanctions, or other measures ap-
propriate to the circumstances."
Dondi Properties Corp. v. Commerce Savings and Loan Ass'n, 121 F.R.D. 284, 288
(N.D. Tex. 1988) (citation and footnote omitted). The court further noted: "We do in-
tend, however, to take the steps necessary to ensure that justice is not removed from
the reach of litigants either because improper litigation tactics interpose unnecessary
delay or because such actions increase the cost of litigation beyond the litigant's finan-
cial grasp." Id.
78. The reason for this reluctance stems from a variety of reasons. Chiefly, it
rarely is clear to a judge exactly who is the proper person to sanction. During the dis-
covery phase of litigation, a judge's familiarity with each party's behavior incident to
the lawsuit is minimal. For this reason, the judiciary has a difficult time policing all
the disputes which arise during the early stages of litigation. Additionally, to appropri-
ately decide a motion requesting sanctions requires a tremendous time expenditure
which the courts simply cannot afford.
verbal agreements by letter. At depositions, make sure that the court
reporter records everything that is said and nothing is treated as "off
the record" without the agreement of all attorneys present. Never
fight fire with fire by returning abuse for abuse. 79 An attorney can
be firm and deny all concessions to abusiveness without initiating it.
Only by conducting himself in a professional manner, precisely cor-
rect, can an attorney establish the opponent's unfair tactics. If the
opponent cuts off his expert witness after a partial answer during a
deposition, the other attorney should ask the witness to complete the
answer. If the opponent tells the witness not to answer, the attorney
should tell the witness that he may answer.
The attorney's goal should be to record the full picture and respon-
sibility for the refusal to respond. If an attorney continues to block
the answer and the witness complies by not answering at the attor-
ney's initiative, then the record is complete. However, a mere objec-
tion by an opponent to a deponent's testimony does not mean that
the answer may not be given.80 Objections are subsequently ruled on
if the deposition is offered in court.8 1
If the attorney expects that the opponent will attempt to exhaust
or anger a witness by personal accusation or by arguing over the
meaning of simple words, the witness should be prepared in advance
to stay calm and to answer with information and not argument.8 2
The witness simply may explain that the testimony is exactly as
stated and that the lawyers are responsible for arguing the fine
points of law and definition. If the opponent is objecting because
some simple word is too vague, the attorney should attempt to see
whether or not the witness himself has any difficulty with the vague-
ness of the word. If the witness joins in this attempt to obfuscate or
conceal, his absurd answers to some of these deposition questions
79. "The short answer is that when Raging Bull is at the other counsel table, the
practitioner must assume the role of matador and move around the ring, constantly
directing the jury's attention to substantive issues until summation, here he will have
the opportunity to gore the bull." Broder, supra note 1, at 67. "By responsible litiga-
tion, the bar can do much to discourage lowball tactics and to demonstrate that the
practitioner does not need lowball to hit an opponent's curve ball out of the park." Id.
80. See FED. R. Civ. P. 30(c) (stating that "[e] idence objected to shall be taken
subject to the objections .... ).
81. See id. 32(b) ("[O]bjection[s] may be made at the trial or hearing to receiving
in evidence any deposition or part thereof for any reason which would require the ex-
clusion of the evidence if the witness were then present and testifying.").
82. "Practitioners must respond to hardball during all phases of trial, but always
in a cool and lawyerlike fashion." Broder, supra note 77, at 64.
The most effective way of coping with a rampaging opponent is to invoke the
assistance of the court. Where the opponent's conduct has been particularly
egregious, the court may allow the practitioner to make that record in front of
the jury, at which time the practitioner should ask the court to give emphatic
and immediate curative instructions.
Id. at 66.
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may be admissible on cross-examination in court.8 3 A clear attempt
to avoid disclosure also may be admissible on the ground that it tends
to prove the witness regarded disclosure as being adverse. Thus, it
could be construed as an admission by a party or a prior inconsistent
statement by a witness.8 4
If the opposing attorney's abuse actually prevents the witness from
answering deposition questions, the injured attorney may go to the
judge or magistrate to obtain relief.8 5 It is very important to take
this step, and to perhaps even seek sanctions, when the misconduct of
the opposing lawyer is sufficiently egregious.8 6 Because the magis-
trate or judge does not relish this sort of dispute, he or she can read-
ily disregard the dispute if the misconduct appears mutual. Thus, if
the complaining attorney has done anything to contribute to the diffi-
culty, the judge is not likely to be receptive to that attorney's pleas.
However, if the attorney has acted properly, and the other lawyer's
conduct is clearly unacceptable, the attorney has a much better
chance of obtaining relief, and he also will have established the objec-
tionable nature of the adversary in the mind of the judge.87
When the trial date arrives, if the attorney can convince the jury of
the adversary's unfairness, he will seize the advantage. If clearly jus-
tified, an attorney should look for an acceptable ground to admit epi-
83. See FED. R. Civ. P. Rule 32(a)(1). This rule states, in part:
At the trial ... any part or all of a deposition, so far as admissible under the
rules of evidence applied as though the witness were then present and testify-
ing, may be used against any party who was present or represented at the tak-
ing of the deposition or who had reasonable notice thereof, in accordance with
any of the following provisions: (1) Any deposition may be used by any party
for the purpose of contradicting or impeaching the testimony of deponent as a
witness, or for any other purpose permitted by the Federal Rules of Evidence.
Id.
84. See supra note 83.
85. See FED. R. CIV. P. Rule 37(a)(2)-(3). This rule states: "If a deponent fails to
answer a question propounded or submitted under Rules 30 or 31 . . . the discovering
party may move for an order compelling an answer .... (3) For purposes of this subdi-
vision an evasive or incomplete answer is to be treated as a failure to answer." Id.
86. Rule 37(b)(1)-(2) provides:
(1) If a deponent fails to be sworn or to answer a question after being directed
'to do so by the court in the district in which the deposition is being taken, the
failure may be considered a contempt of that court. (2) If a party . . . fails to
obey an order to provide or permit discovery .... the court in which the action
is pending may make such orders in regard to the failure as are just ....
FED. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(1)-(2).
87. This can be a substantial benefit because an attorney who is not credible with
the judge must prove everything and nothing he says or does is accepted without ques-
tion. See Arnett, supra note 1, at 128; Rymer, supra note 1, at 81.
sodes of unfairness into evidence.8 8 These episodes may come during
the trial itself. If the opponent makes a sidebar remark, the other
attorney should ask the court to instruct the jury to disregard the re-
mark-if the judge does not do so without request. If the judge does
not admonish the offending lawyer for this conduct, and the other at-
torney has to represent his client without the protection of the judge,
that attorney should list every statement made by the opposing coun-
sel which has been unsupported by proof. Then, in the course of fi-
nal summation, the attorney should mention all of those statements,
explaining that the opponent must have made them with the intent
to deceive the jurors. This tactic also works when the opponent
makes a statement during voir dire of the jury panel or during an
opening statement, but then fails to support that statement with
evidence.
IX. CONCLUSION
I began this article by telling about the lawyer misconduct I en-
countered during my early years as a practitioner. There is a big dif-
ference between the prospects for successful misconduct in those
days and the prospects for similar behavior today. In days gone by,
jurors not only tolerated but expected melodrama and "great per-
formances" by lawyers on behalf of clients. Judges also went along
with this gamesmanship as central to the skills of practice. Never-
theless, jurors and judges today want to get down to business and de-
cide their cases correctly;89 they do not want performances and game-
playing.90 Instead, they will give their attention to the lawyer who
88. For example, an attorney may wish to expose the opposition's attempts to
coach witnesses by comparing live testimony with differing deposition responses.
Moreover, an attorney guilty of over-reaching, casting aspersions, and launching per-
sonal attacks and insinuations is easily thwarted in closing argument before the jury.
Counsel may employ an effective two-step process. First, calmly remind the jury that
the scathing remarks advanced by the opposition were not proven by the evidence.
Second, ask the jury what that says about the character of opposing counsel and his or
her respect for the intelligence of the jury.
89. "Perhaps the most troubling symptom of all is a win-at-any-cost-indeed, a
very high cost-mentality." Rymer, supra note 1 at 80. Judge Rymer also stated:
Integrity means honor and civility as well: never to cut a corner or miscite a
case, fudge a material fact, go back on your word, or take a position because
you can get away with it instead of because it is the right thing to do; to al-
ways be helpful, courteous, polite, and professional to the judge and jury, and
be considerate of opposing counsel and the other side.
Id. at 81.
90. See Broder, supra note 1, at 64.
[T]he legitimate hardball player may make a lot of niggling but technically le-
gitimate objections to torture an opponent and convince the jury of his cor-
rectness and his adversary's errors. As with any technique that does not
concentrate on the merits of the case, this tactic will easily backfire since ju-
ries have small patience with technicalities, whether legitimate or not.
Id.
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knows the case and presents it honestly and fairly. Competence and
trustworthiness win sympathetic attention.91 Tricks, pretense, and
the slightest sign of unfairness invite rejection.92 Credibility is the
objective for the litigator today.93 Rambo may succeed in the theater,
but he self-destructs in the courtroom.
91. "[T]he Appellate Division nevertheless granted relief on account of defense
counsel's obnoxious behavior." Id. (emphasis added).
92. "Lack of civility does not win cases; it often loses them. Civility in fact brings
advocacy to the fore and focuses the case where the focus ought to be. It is part of the
creed not to lose objectivity or let personalities interfere with judgement." Rymer,
supra note 1, at 81.
93. See Dondi Properties Corp. v. Commerce Savings and Loan Ass'n, 121 F.R.D.
284, 289 (N.D. Tex. 1988). The court explained:
We think the standards we now adopt are a necessary corollary to existing
law, and are appropriately established to signal our strong disapproval of prac-
tices that have no place in our legal system of justice and to emphasize that a
lawyer's conduct, both with respect to the court and to other lawyers, should
at all times be characterized by honesty and fair play.
Id.
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ORDER OF
THE SUPREME COURT OF TEXAS
AND
THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS
The conduct of a lawyer should be characterized at all times by
honesty, candor, and fairness. In fulfilling his or her primary duty to a
client, a lawyer must be ever mindful of the profession's broader duty to
the legal system.
The Supreme Court of Texas and the Court of Criminal Appeals are
committed to eliminating a practice in our State by a minority of lawyers
of abusive tactics which have surfaced in many parts of our country. We
believe such tactics are a disservice to our citizens, harmful to clients, and
demeaning to our profession.
The abusive tactics range from lack of civility to outright hostility and
obstructionism. Such behavior does not serve justice but tends to delay
and often deny justice. The lawyers who use abusive tactics instead of
being part of the solution have become part of the problem.
The desire for respect and confidence by lawyers from the public
should provide the members of our profession with the necessary incen-
tive to attain the highest degree ofethical and professional conduct. These
rules are primarily aspirational. Compliance with the rules depends
primarily upon understanding and voluntary compliance, secondarily
upon re-enforcement by peer pressure and public opinion, and finally
when necessary by enforcement by the courts through their inherent
powers and rules already in existence.
These standards are not a set ofrules that lawyers can use and abuse
to incite ancillary litigation or arguments over whether or not they have
been observed.
We must always be mindful that the practice oflaw is a profession. As
members of a learned art we pursue a common calling in the spirit of public
service. We have a proud tradition. Throughout the history of our nation,
the members of our citizenry have looked to the ranks ofour profession for
leadership and guidance. Let us now as a profession each rededicate
ourselves to practice law so we can restore public confidence in our
profession, faithfully serve our clients, and fulfill our responsibility to the
legal system.
The Supreme Court of Texas and the Court of Criminal Appeals
hereby promulgate and adopt "The Texas Lawyer's Creed -- A Man-
date for Professionalism" as attached hereto and made a part hereof.
In Chambers, this 7th day of November, 1989.
The Supreme Court of Texas
Thomas R. Phillip
klin S. Spears, Justice
C. L. Ray, Ju ice
Ra,,lr'A. Gonzalez, J~stij
LOscar H. Mauzy, Jutice
The Court of Criminal Appeals
Mia ael r c k, Presiding Ju.
Sam Houston Clinton, Judge
Marvin 0. Teague, Judge
Chuck IMiller Judge
Charles F. (Chuck).5S mpbell, Judge
Bill White Judge
David A. Berc elmann, Jr., Jud
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THE SUPREME COURT OF TEXAS
AND
THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS
THE TEXAS LAWYER'S CREED --
A MANDATE FOR PROFESSIONALISM
I am a lawyer; I am entrusted by the People of Texas to preserve and
improve our legal system. I am licensed by the Supreme Court of Texas.
I must therefore abide by the Texas Disciplinary Rules of Professional
Conduct, but I know that Professionalism requires more than merely
avoiding the violation of laws and rules. I am committed to this Creed for
no other reason than it is right.
I. OUR LEGAL SYSTEM
A lawyer owes to the administration of justice personal dignity,
integrity, and independence. A lawyer should always adhere to the
highest principles of professionalism.
1. I am passionately proud of my profession. Therefore, "My
word is my bond."
2. I am responsible to assure that all persons have access to
competent representation regardless of wealth or poF-tion in life.
3. I commit myself to an adequate and effective pro bono
program.
4. I am obligated to educate my clients, the public, and other
lawyers regarding the spirit and letter of this Creed.
5. I will always be conscious of my duty to the judicial system.
IH. LAWYER TO CLIENT
A lawyer owes to a client allegiance, learning, skill, and industry. A
lawyer shall employ all appropriate means to protect and advance the
client's legitimate rights, claims, and objectives. A lawyer shall not be
deterred by any real or imagined fear of judicial disfavor or public
unpopularity, nor be influenced by mere self-interest.
1. I will advise my client of the contents of this Creed when
undertaking representation.
2. I will endeavor to achieve my client's lawful objectives in
legal transactions and in litigation as quickly and economically as pos-
sible.
3. I will be loyal and commited to my client's lawful objectives,
but I will not permit that loyalty and commitment to interfere with my
duty to provide objective and independent advice.
4. I will advise my client that civility and courtesy are expected
and are not a sign of weakness.
5. I will advise my client of proper and expected behavior.
6. I will treat adverse parties and witnesses with fairness and
due consideration. A client has no right to demand that I abuse anyone
or indulge in any offensive conduct.
7. I will advise my client that we will not pursue conduct which
is intended primarily to harass or drain the financial resources of the
opposing party.
8. I will advise my client that we will not pursue tactics which
are intended primarily for delay.
9. I will advise my client that we will not pursue any course of
action which is without merit.
10. I will advise my client that I reserve the right to determine
whether to grant accommodations to opposing counsel in all matters that
do not adversely affect my client's lawful objectives. A client has no right
to instruct me to refuse reasonable requests made by other counsel.
11. I will advise my client regarding the availability of media-
tion, arbitration, and other alternative methods of resolving and settling
disputes.
III. LAWYER TO LAWYER
A lawyer owes to opposing counsel, in the conduct of legal transac-
tions and the pursuit of litigation, courtesy, candor, cooperation, and
scrupulous observance of all agreements and mutual understandings. Ill
feelings between clients shall not influence a lawyer's conduct, attitude,
or demeanor toward opposing counsel. A lawyer, shall not engage in
unprofessional conduct in retailiation against other unprofessional con-
duct.
1. I will be courteous, civil, and prompt in oral and written
communications.
2. I will not quarrel over matters of form or style, but I will
concentrate on matters of substance.
3. I will identify for other counsel or parties all changes I have
made in documents submitted for review.
4. I will attempt to prepare documents which correctly reflect
the agreement of the parties. I will not include provisions which have not
been agreed upon or omit provisions which are necessary to reflect the
agreement of the parties.
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5. I will notify opposing counsel, and, if appropriate, the Court
or othei persons, as soon as practicable, when hearings, depositions,
meetings, conferences or closings are cancelled.
6. I will agree to reasonable requests for extensions of time and
for waiver of procedural formalities, provided legitimate objectives of my
client will not be adversely affected.
7. I will not serve motions or pleadings in any manner that
unfairly limits another party's opportunity to respond.
8. I will attempt to resolve by agreement my objections to
matters contained in pleadings and discovery requests and responses.
9. I can disagree without being disagreeable. I recognize that
effective representation does not require antagonistic or obnoxious behav-
ior. I will neither encourage not knowingly permit my client or anyone
under my control to do anything which would be unethical or improper if
done by me.
10. I will not, without good cause, attribute bad motives or un-
ethical conduct to opposing counsel norbring the profession into disrepute
by unfounded accusations of impropriety. I will avoid disparaging per-
sonal remarks or acrimony towards opposing counsel, parties and wit-
nesses. I will not be influenced by any ill feeling between clients. I will
abstain from any allusion to personal peculiarities or idiosyncrasies of
opposing counsel.
11. I will not take advantage, by causing any default or dis-
missal to be rendered, when I know the identity of an opposing counsel,
without first inquiring about that counsel's intention to proceed.
12. I will promptly submit orders to the Court. I will deliver
copies to opposing counsel before or contemporaneously with submisstion
to the court. I will promptly approve the form of orders wlch accurately
reflect the substance of the rulings of the Court.
13. I will not attempt to gain an unfair advantage by sending the
Court or its staff correspondence or copies of correspondence.
14. I will not arbitrarily schedule a deposition, Court appear-
ance, or hearing until a good faith effort has been made to schedule it by
agreement.
15. I will readily stipulate to undisputed facts in order to avoid
needless costs or inconveniecne for any party.
16. I will refrain from excessive and abusive discovery.
17. I will comply with all reasonable discovery requests. I will
not resist discovery requests which are not objectionable. I will not make
objections nor give instructions to a witness for the purpose of delaying or
obstructing the discovery process. I will encourage witnesses to respond
to all deposition questions which are reasonably understandable. I will
neither encourage nor permit my witness to quibble about words where
their meaning is reasonably clear.
18. I will not seek Court intervention to obtain discovery which
is clearly improper and not discoverable.
19. I will not seek sanctions or disqualification unless it is
necessary for protection of my client's lawful objectives or is fullyjustified
by the circumstances.
MY. LAWYER AND JUDGE
Lawyers and judges owe each other respect, diligence, candor,
punctuality, and protection against unjust and improper criticism and
attack. Lawyers and judges are equally responsible to protect the dignity
and independence of the Court and the profession.
1. I will always recognize that the position of judge is the
symbol of both the judicial system and administration of justice. I will
refrain from conduct that degrades this symbol.
2. I will conduct myself in court in a professional manner and
demonstrate my respect for the Court and the law.
3. I will treat counsel, opposing parties, the Court, and mem-
bers of the Court staff with courtesy and civility.
4. I will be punctual.
5. I will not engage in any conduct Which offends the dignity
and decorum of proceedings.
6. I will not knowingly misrepresent, mischaracterize, mis-
quote or miscite facts or authorities to gain an advantage.
7. I will respect the rulings of the Court.
8. I will give the issues in controversy deliberate, impartial and
studied analysis and consideration.
9. 1 will be considerate of the time constraints and pressures
imposed upon the Court, Court staff and counsel in efforts to administer
justice and resolve disputes.
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THE TEXAS LAWYER'S CREED --
A MANDATE FOR PROFESSIONALISM
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